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NOTE
INCREASED LIMITATIONS ON PATRONAGE
PRACTICES: BRANTI v. FINKEL
HORTLY after Peter Branti was appointed public defender of
Rockland County, New York, by the newly elected, Democrat-controlled county legislature, he executed termination notices for six of
the nine assistant public defenders then in office.' Among those discharged were Republicans Aaron Finkel and Alan Tabakman, who had
been appointed when the Republicans previously had controlled the legislature. Finkel and Tabakman, described by Branti as competent attorneys,
were discharged solely because they did not have the necessary Democratic sponsors. 2 Alleging violation of their rights under the first 3 and four1. The county legislature appoints the Rockland County public defender for a term of
six years. The public defender than appoints nine assistants who serve at his discretion. In
substance, however, the county legislators make the hiring decisions pursuant to a sponsorship program.
2. Political sponsorship is the practice of hiring for patronage positions only those persons who have been recommended by political party leaders. Sponsorship generally is obtained by pledging allegiance to a political party, working for party candidates, or
contributing money to the party. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976). The sponsorship procedures followed in Branti are described at 445 U.S. at 510 n.5. The Reagan
administration has used a similar procedure recently to fill approximately 1,500 lower level
patronage positions. See TIME, Mar. 16, 1981, at 32. Under the Reagan program prospective appointees must obtain "political clearance" from a Reagan assistant prior to their appointment. Id.
3. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. While not explicitly guaranteed by the first amendment, freedom of political belief and association has long been
recognized as implicit in the right to free speech. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 356
(1976) (political patronage restricts free speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per
curiam) (limits on political campaign expenditures infringe free speech); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (compelling a professor to disclose the content of his
lectures, his knowledge of a political party, and his knowledge of the party's adherents infringes free speech). See generally Emerson, Freedom of Association andFreedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); Rice, The ConstitutionalRight ofAssociation, 16 HASTINGS L.J.
491 (1965). In Elrod the Supreme Court stated: "Our concern with the impact of patronage
on political belief and association does not occur in the abstract, for political belief and
association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment." 427
U.S. at 356. The Court found that "to the extent [that patronage] compels or restrains belief
and association, [it] is inimical to the process which undergirds our system of government
and is 'at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.'"
Id. at 357 (quoting Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 576 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied,410 U.S. 928 (1973)).
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teenth 4 amendments, Finkel and Tabakman sued to enjoin Branti from
discharging them from their positions as assistant public defenders. 5 The
district court granted the injunction, holding that because assistant public
defenders are not confidential or policymaking personnel they may not be
discharged solely on the basis of party affiliation. 6 The Court of Appeals7
for the Second Circuit affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed: The
discharge of government employees based solely on their political affiliation is prohibited unless such affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
effective job performance. Brandi v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PATRONAGE DISMISSALS

Traditionally, the courts have treated government employment as a
privilege revocable at the will of the hiring authority. 8 The traditional
treatment, based on a "right-privilege" distinction, 9 resulted from Justice
Holmes's opinion in McAulie v. Mayor of New Bedford.'0 In McAuiFje
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the firing of a policeman who had been dismissed for expressing political opinions in violation
of department regulations."' The court stated that "[tihe petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." 12 Reasoning that a government employee accepts employment on the terms that are offered to him, 13 the court concluded that the city could impose any reasonable condition on the
4. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall.., deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The
fourteenth amendment protects first amendment freedoms from state infringement. See,
e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (constitutional protection from state infringement extends to right to associate with political parties); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (fourteenth amendment embraces freedom of speech). See generally
Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970).

5. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
6. Id. at 1285. In so holding, the district court relied on Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,
375 (1976), in which the Supreme Court delineated the pre-Branti standard for patronage
dismissals. Under this criterion the dismissal of a government employee solely because of
political belief was permissible only when the employee's work could be characterized as
confidential or policymaking. Id. at 346-68, 375. For a discussion of the Elrod standard, see

text accompanying notes 50-65 infra.
7. Branti v. Finkel, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).
8. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (civil service em-

ployment is a privilege not guaranteed by first amendment), ajj'dper curiam by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29
N.E. 517 (1892) (policeman's job is privilege terminable at will).
9. Under the right-privilege distinction, the government could deny a right to a person

only for specific, constitutionally permissible reasons. A privilege, however, could be denied
for any reason. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 478 (1978). For further discussion of the right-privilege distinction, see Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L.

REV. 1439 (1968).
10. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
11. 29 N.E. at 517-18.

12. Id. at 517.
13. Id. at 518.
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employees holding offices within its control. 14 Similarly, in Bailey v. Richardson 15 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied
the right-privilege distinction to uphold the firing of a civil service employee on the grounds of suspected involvement in the Communist
Party. 16 The Bailey court reiterated the McAuliffe right-privilege distinction 17 and stated that although the first amendment protected freedom of
speech and assembly, it did not guarantee government employment.18
Protection against termination of employment for unconstitutional reasons was extended to nonpatronage public employees 19 for the first time in
Keyishian v.Board of Regents. 20 In Keyishian the plaintiffs, faculty members at a state university, had been required by state statute and regulations2 1 to sign a certificate that they were not and never had been
Communists. Each plaintiff had been informed that failure to sign such a
certificate would result in dismissal. 22 Finding the statutes unconstitutional, 23 the Supreme Court rejected the traditional right-privilege distinction. 24 Rather, the Court stated that "the theory that public employment
which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected. ' '25
14. Id.
15. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C.Cir. 1950), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
16. 182 F.2d at 65.
17. The court, however, did not cite McAuliffe in its discussion.
18. 182 F.2d at 59. The court stated:
[Tihere is no basic right to Government employ, any more than there is to
employment by any other particular employer. . . . [Aln office created by an
act of Congress. . .depends for its continuance. . . upon the will of its creator, and the possession of [that office] may be burdened with any conditions
not prohibited by the Constitution.
Id. at 60 (quoting Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867)). The court expressly held
that Congress and the President may, in the interests of governmental efficiency, restrict or
prohibit free exercise of the right to political speech and assembly. 182 F.2d at 59-60.
19. Nonpatronage employment refers to those government positions that are filled and
vacated on a basis other than political affiliation. Patronage employment may be defined as
the practice of hiring or dismissing government employees for partisan political reasons.
See Elrod v. Burns, 472 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1976). For background on the history of patronage practices, see C. FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE (1904); M.
TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, TO THE VICTOR . . . (1972).
20. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
21. Texts of the relevant statutes and regulations appear in the appendix to the Supreme
Court's opinion. Id. at 610-20.
22. The plaintiffs refused to sign and were dismissed or threatened with dismissal. Id.
at 592.
23. The Court held the statutes unconstitutional because "they proscribe mere knowing
membership [in the Communist Party] without any showing of specific intent to further the
unlawful aims of the Communist Party of the United States or of the State of New York."
Id. at 609-10.
24. Id. at 605-06. The Supreme Court reiterated its abandonment of the right-privilege
distinction in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973): "[T]his Court now has rejected the
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a government benefit is characterized as
a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Id. at 644 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374
(1971)).
25. 385 U.S. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d
Cir. 1965)).
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The Supreme Court again addressed a public employee's claim of unconstitutional dismissal in Perry v. Sindermann.26 In Perry a state college
professor claimed that his teaching contract had not been renewed solely
because he had criticized publicly the college's board of governors. 27 The
Court held that dismissal on such a basis would be a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional right to freedom of speech. 28 In so holding, the Court
reiterated its position in Keyishian that the government may not deny a
person a benefit for reasons that would infringe his constitutionally pro29
tected interests.
Despite the Supreme Court's restrictions on government employee dismissal in Perry and Keyishian, subsequent state and federal decisions refused to extend similar protection to patronage employees. 30 The courts
relied, instead, on the traditional right-privilege approach 3' to deny relief
to public employees who had been dismissed for patronage reasons. In
Alomar v. Dwyer 32 the Second Circuit considered the permissibility of patronage dismissals. Alomar, a Democrat, had been employed by the city
of Rochester for three years as a bilingual stenographer and as a neighborhood services representative. After gaining control of the city government
in 1970, the Republicans asked Alomar to change her party affiliation to
Republican. When Alomar refused to do so, the city manager discharged
her. Relying on Bailey v. Richardson,33 the court found Alomar's job to be
a privilege terminable at will 3 4 and concluded that the Constitution does
not prohibit the dismissal of government35employees on the basis of their
political beliefs, activities, or affiliations.
Similarly, in American Federation of State, County & MunicipalEmployees v. Shapp36 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the patronage
26. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

27. Id. at 595. The plaintiff also alleged that the manner in which his employment had
been terminated violated his procedural due process right. 1d.
28. Id. at 597-98. The Court did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs claims, as the
case had been decided by the district court on a motion for summary judgment. 1d. at 59596. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, which had remanded
the case to the district court. Id. at 603.
29. Id. at 597-98.
30. See, e.g., Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971) (bilingual stenographer and

neighborhood services representative), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972); American Fed'n of
State, County & Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (197 1) (various state
transportation department employees). For a definition of patronage employment, see note
19 supra.
31. See text accompanying notes 8-18 supra.
32. 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972). For commentary on
Alomar, see Note, 4 ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Spoils System-The Judiciary Visits Patronage Place, 57 IOWA L. REv. 1320, 1330-33 (1972).
33. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), af'dper curiam by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.

918 (1951); see text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
34. 447 F.2d at 483.
35. Id. (quoting Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afdper curiam
by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (195 1)). The court stated that "the sole protection

for government employees who have been dismissed for political reasons must be found in
civil service statutes or regulations." 447 F.2d at 483. The court noted that Alomar did not

have protected status under New York civil service law. Id.
36. 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971). For commentary on Shapp, see Note, Non-Civil
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dismissal of some 2,000 Republican state employees by the newly elected
Democratic governor. As in Alomar, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
adopted the traditional right-privilege approach and held that patronage
37
employees could be discharged on the basis of their political affiliation.
The court, however, also relied on a waiver theory in upholding the patronage dismissals, stating that "[t]hose who, figuratively speaking, live by
38
the political sword must be prepared to die by the political sword."
Under this theory, the court found that because the employees had obtained their jobs by patronage practices,39they should not be heard to complain when fired for patronage reasons.
In 1972 the Seventh Circuit first extended constitutional protection to
patronage employees in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis. 4° The
Democratic plaintiffs in Lewis had been employed by the Illinois secretary
of state in positions as building employees, clerical workers, and license
examiners. 4 ' When a Republican was appointed to fill the unexpired term
of the then Democratic secretary of state, the Republican dismissed the
plaintiffs. 4 2 Although the court declined to rely on the Shapp waiver theory4 3 and rejected the right-privilege distinction, 44 it stated that compelling
state interests may justify the curtailment of a nonpolicymaking public servant's first amendment rights. 45 The court concluded, however, that the
state had not met its burden of establishing that its interests 46 justified such
an infringement of the employees' constitutional liberties. 47 Although the
court viewed the patronage system unfavorably as a whole,48 the opinion
Service Employees Are Employees at Will and May Be Summarily Discharged on Account of
PoliticalAssociation, 17 VILL. L. REV. 750 (1972).

37. Id. at 378.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Fourth Circuit most recently applied the Shapp waiver theory in Nunnery
v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975). The
plaintiff in Nunnery had been discharged from her job as manager of a state-owned liquor
store because she did not actively support the Republican Party. The court held that because the plaintiff had accepted her job aware of its patronage classification, she had waived
her right to complain of being dismissed for political reasons. 503 F.2d at 1359-60. See
generally Comment, PatronageDismissals: ConstitutionalLimits and PoliticalJustifications,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 312-17 (1974).
40. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973). The majority opinion in Lewis was written by then Judge John Paul Stevens. For commentary on Lewis, see
Note, Discharge of Non-policy-making Public Employees on Ground ofPolitical Affiliation Infringes Employees' Freedom ofAssociation, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1090 (1973).
41. 473 F.2d at 563.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 574. Though not rejecting the Shapp waiver theory, the court concluded that
there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a factual basis for such a defense. Id.
at 573-74.
44. Id. at 568.
45. Id. at 572. The court stated that government interests could not justify surrender, as
opposed to mere curtailment, of an employee's first amendment rights. Id.
46. The state interests advanced were effective supervision of employees and the need
for broad employer discretion. Id. at 574.
47. Id. at 576.
48. Judge Stevens found the long-standing tradition of patronage practices in American
politics insufficient to justify its infringement of first amendment freedoms. Id. at 568. Stevens described the patronage system as a mechanism that inhibits the free political choice of
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left unquestioned the right of the hiring authority49to dismiss a policymaking employee on the basis of political affiliation.
The United States Supreme Court first considered the propriety of patronage dismissals in Elrod v. Burns.5 0 The Republican plaintiffs in Elrod
had been employed by the sheriffs office in Cook County, Illinois, in various nonpolicymaking capacities. 5 ' When the Democratic defendant became sheriff, he discharged the plaintiffs solely because they had not
obtained Democratic sponsorship as required by local practice.5 2 The defendant in Elrod advanced three governmental interests to support the patronage dismissals: (1) increased governmental effectiveness and
efficiency; (2) the need for political loyalty among employees to ensure
of the demoeffective implementation of policy; and (3) the preservation
53
cratic process through patronage-generated party support.
In a plurality decision 54 three Justices decided that patronage dismissals
fall within the prohibitions of Keyishian and Perry because threatened dismissal for failure to support the favored party inhibits and penalizes the
exercise of protected belief and association.5 5 The plurality noted, however, that the prohibitions were not absolute and that infringement of first
amendment freedoms resulting from patronage firings was permissible
when some "vital government end .. .outweigh[ed] the loss of constitutionally protected rights."'56 Citing other less restrictive alternatives availmillions of public servants. "While the patronage system is defended in the name of democratic tradition," he wrote, "its paternalistic impact on the political process is actually at war
with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment." Id. at 576.
49. Id. at 574.
50. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). See Comment, PatronageDismissals and Compelling State Interests Can the Policymaking/NonpolicymakingDistinction Withstand Strict Scrutiny?, 1978
S. ILL. L. REV. 278; Note, Freedom of Speech Association-GopernmentEmployees-Elrod v.
Burns, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 782 (1977); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Patronage Dismissalsof Public Employees: Elrod v. Burns, 9 CONN. L. REV. 678 (1977); Note,
Will the Victor be Denied the Spoils? Constitutional Challenges to PatronageDismissals, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1977); Note, Elrod v. Burns.- Patronagein Public Employment,
13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 175 (1977); Note, Elrod v.Burns; Chipping at the Iceberg of Political Patronage, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 225 (1977).

51. 427 U.S. at 350-51.
52. Id. at 351.
53. Id. at 364-68. As suggested by Justice Powell's dissent, other government interests
may be offered to support patronage dismissals. Id. at 382-87; see note 65 infra. It is likely,
however, that such interests could be furthered by means less restrictive than patronage
dismissals. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
54. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, was joined by Justices White and Marshall. Justice Stewart filed an opinion concurring in the result in which Justice Blackmun
joined. Justice Powell was joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
The Chief Justice also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
55. 427 U.S. at 359. The defendant also had argued that the employees had waived any
objections to patronage dismissal by knowingly accepting patronage jobs. In a footnote discussion the Court stated that by holding that patronage dismissals infringe first amendment
rights, it necessarily rejected the waiver theory. Id. at 360 n. 13.
56. Id. at 363. The Court thus applied a strict judicial scrutiny standard of review.
Under this standard, the government may not abridge first amendment rights unless it shows
a compelling necessity. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,25 (1976); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 703
(1978).
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able to the government, 57 the Court found each of the three interests
to justify patronage dismissals of
advanced by the defendants 5insufficient
8
employees.
nonpolicymaking
In the concurring opinion Justice Stewart refused to join the plurality's
"wide-ranging" opinion, 59 stating that the facts did not require consideration of the permissibility of patronage hiring practices. 60 Justice Stewart
did agree, however, that a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential .. .embe discharged . . .upon the sole ground of his political
ployee can[not]
61
beliefs."
Justice Powell disagreed with both the plurality and concurring opinions. 62 After first noting the long-standing contributions of patronage
practice to party strength and democratic government, 63 Justice Powell asserted that the plaintiffs had waived their first amendment freedoms by
accepting their positions with knowledge of customary political discharge
practices. 64 Justice Powell found that, in any event, the governmental inon first amendment freedoms
terests involved outweighed the infringement
65
resulting from patronage dismissals.
57. 427 U.S. at 366-67. The plurality noted that discharges for cause could promote
government effectiveness, and confining dismissals to policymaking positions could satisfy
the government's need to ensure effective implementation of policy. Id. The Court found

unpersuasive the defendant's argument that patronage-generated party support promotes
the democratic process. Id. at 368-69. It noted, however, that the survival of the two-party
system prior to the institution of patronage practices, and after recent merit system reductions in patronage power, evidences the existence of less restrictive alternatives to achieving
the contributions that patronage may make to the democratic process. Id. The theory that
in public employment cases government interests must be promoted by the least restrictive
alternative had been previously ennunciated in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In
Shelton the Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute that required teachers to
list organizational connections as a condition to continued employment. The Court found
the statute unconstitutional, stating that "[t]he breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." 1d. at 488.
58. 427 U.S. at 372. See also text accompanying note 45 supra.
59. 427 U.S. at 374. Justice Stewart was joined by Justice Blackmun.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 375.
62. Id. at 376-89.
63. Id. at 377-80. Tracing the roots of patronage to the administration of George
Washington, Justice Powell noted that "[platronage practices broadened the base of political
participation by providing incentives to take part in the process, thereby increasing the volume of political discourse in society." Id. at 379. Justice Powell argued that patronage
"strengthened parties, and hence encouraged the development of institutional responsibility
to the electorate on a permanent basis." Id.; cf. text accompanying note 48 supra (patronage
inhibits free political choice). See generally C. FISH, supra note 19; D. RoSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971); Sorauf, Patronageand Party, 3 MIDWEST J.
POL. SCI. 115, 115-16 (1959), all relied upon by the dissent in Elrod.
64. 427 U.S. at 380-81. In asserting this waiver theory, Justice Powell relied on American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
65. 427 U.S. at 382-87. The governmental interests in Elrod included encouraging
political activity and strengthening political parties. 1d. at 382-83; see note 63 supra. Justice
Powell's dissent found that patronage served these interests at the local level by encouraging
donations of time and money, and by enabling local parties to maintain a high profile between elections. 472 U.S. at 383-85.
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BRA4NTI V FNKEL

In Brand v. Finkel the Supreme Court applied a new standard for considering the constitutionality of patronage dismissals to strike down the
dismissal of two assistant public defenders. Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority,6 6 initially reaffirmed the Court's position in Elrod67 that the
knowing acceptance of patronage employment is not a waiver of first
68
amendment rights sufficient to justify dismissal based on political belief.
69
Having disposed of the preliminary waiver question, the Court then
turned to the defendant's two principal arguments for reversal. First, the
majority rejected the argument that the Elrod holding is limited to those
situations when employees are coerced into pledging allegiance to a political party that they would not otherwise support.70 Rather, the majority
found that to sustain a constitutional challenge, a discharged employee has
to prove only that he
was discharged because of party affiliation or lack of
71
party sponsorship.
Secondly, the majority addressed the defendant's argument that the position of assistant public defender is legitimately subject to political dismissal practices under the Elrod policymaking and confidentiality standard.
Although the majority recognized that first amendment rights may have to
66. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun.
67. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of the waiver argument in Elrod, see note
55 supra.
68. 445 U.S. at 512 n.6. The defendant had argued that the plaintiffs knew they were
subject to dismissal for patronage reasons when they accepted their positions and thus, had
no reasonable expectation of continued employment. The Court found, however, that "the
lack of a reasonable expectation of continued employment is not sufficient to justify a dismissal based solely on an employee's private political beliefs." Id. The defendant also argued that the plaintiffs, Finkel and Tabakman, were not dismissed, rather they simply were
not reappointed after their terms of office had expired. The Court, however, refused to
distinguish between a failure to reappoint and a dismissal for the purpose of applying a less
stringent standard to justify the discontinuation of government employment solely on the
grounds of political belief. Id.
69. The defendant also argued that the evidence showed that regardless of political considerations, he would have dismissed Finkel and Tabakman on the grounds of incompetence. Id. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), in
which the Court held that even though a teacher's activities protected by the first amendment were a substantial factor in the decision to not renew his contract, first amendment
rights are not infringed if the board of education is able to prove that it would have made
the same decision in any event. Id. at 287. The Branti Court found this contention to be
foreclosed by the district court's finding that the plaintiffs were discharged solely on the basis
of party affiliation. 445 U.S. at 510. The Court expressed no opinion as to whether the Mt
Healthy holding would extend to patronage dismissals. Id. at 512 n.6. The barriers to patronage challenges posed by an application of the Mt. Healthy defense clearly could limit
the impact of Elrod and Brand.
70. Id. at 516-17. The Court stated that political coercion in its most blatant form occurs when the hiring authority threatens to dismiss an employee unless the employee
changes his party affiliation or contributes to party candidates. Id. at 516. The defendants
had argued that Eirod prohibits only those dismissals resulting from such practices. Id. The
Court, however, stated that the defendants' interpretation would emasculate the principles
set out in Elrod. Id. The Court found that coercion of belief necessarily results from the
knowledge alone that job retention is contingent on party sponsorship or affiliation. Id.
71. Id. at 517.
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yield to a state's vital interests in maintaining governmental effectiveness
and efficiency, 72 it rejected the Elrod plurality's reasoning that the determinative factor in such a consideration is whether the employee's position is
classified as confidential or policymaking. 73 Rather, the Court delineated a
new standard, stating that the determinative factor is whether party affilia'74
tion is an "appropriate requirement for. . . effective [job] performance.
Noting that the primary allegiance of an assistant public defender should
be to the clients he represents rather than to a political party, the Court
found that conditioning a public defender's employment on party affiliation would undermine, rather than promote, effective job performance. 7 5
Justice Stewart, dissenting, agreed that patronage dismissals may violate
first amendment rights. 76 Justice Stewart, however, would retain the standard enunciated in the plurality and in his concurring opinion in Elrod
that political beliefs are not a proper reason for dismissal of a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee. 77 Drawing an analogy
to a firm of lawyers in the private sector, Justice Stewart reasoned that the
position of assistant public defender is one that instinctively requires mutual confidence and78 trust and should be subject, therefore, to patronage
dismissal practices.
Justice Powell dissented, disagreeing with the majority on two
grounds. 79 In Part I of his opinion Justice Powell criticized the standard
adopted by the majority for determining the permissibility of patronage
dismissals.80 Noting the customary consideration of political affiliation in
the selection of United States attorneys, Justice Powell argued that the
sweeping language articulated in the majority's "vague" and "overbroad"
opinion creates a standard that is "both uncertain in its application and
impervious to legislative change." 8' In Parts II-V Justice Powell turned to
the more fundamental issue of whether the first amendment ever prohibits
the firing of public employees on the basis of political affiliation. 82 He
argued that patronage appointments serve important governmental interests by helping to build stable political parties 83 and by furthering the right
72. Id.
73. Id. at 518.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 519-20.

76. Id. at 520.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 520-21.
79. Id. at 521. Justice Powell, who also wrote the dissenting opinion in Elrod, was

joined by Justice Rehnquist and, as to Part I, by Justice Stewart.
80. Id. at 522-26.
81. Id. at 525. Powell stated that the majority's holding left uncertain the propriety of
politically motivated dismissals at all levels of government, particularly dismissals of United
States attorneys. Id.
82. Id. at 526-34. Powell distinguished both Keyishian and Perry, cases relied upon by
the majority, from the present case by observing that neither case involved a patronage
position. Id. at 526. For a discussion of Keyishian and Perry, see text accompanying notes
19-29 supra.

83. 445 U.S. at 527-32. Powell concluded that the effect of the majority decision would
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of local voters to structure their government. 84 As in Elrod, Justice Powell
concluded that the governmental interests served by patronage justify any
of first amendment rights resulting from patronage pracinfringement
85
tices.
The new standard articulated in Brand further narrows the range of
government positions that legitimately may be vacated through political
discharges. Although the majority gives several examples of government
86
positions for which political affiliation is an appropriate requirement, it
leaves in question the permissibility of patronage dismissals in a wide
range of public jobs previously thought to be immune under the Elrod
policymaking and confidentiality standard. 87 Accordingly, the full impact
on Brand will depend in part on future delineations of the appropriate
performance requirement standard.
The Court's opinion in Brand also threatens the continued existence of
patronage hiring practices. Although the Court explicitly limits its holding
to patronage dismissals, 88 Brand's increased limitations on such practices
will necessarily lessen the number of new job vacancies available for patronage appointments. 89 Additionally, the Court makes clear that future
challenges to patronage hiring practices will likely be met by the imposition of limitations similar to those which Brand now imposes on dismissals. The Court observes that "[tihe compensation of government
employees. . . must be justified by a governmental purpose." 90 Yet, such
a justification would be difficult to formulate for patronage hirings. Characterizing the use of political considerations in selecting assistant public
defenders as "deeply disturbing," the majority concludes that "[n]o 'compelling state interest' can be served by insisting that those who represent
[indigent] defendants publicly profess to be Democrats (or Republibe "to decrease the accountability and denigrate the role of our national political parties,"
thereby increasing the influence of special interest groups. Id. at 531-32.
84. Id. at 532-34.
85. Id. at 534.
86. The Court noted that although a state university's football coach formulates policy,
his political affiliation would not affect his job performance. Conversely, a governor's assistants and speechwriters might not perform effectively unless those persons shared the governor's political beliefs and party affiliation. Id. at 518.
87. For example, both the dissent and the majority left in question the permissibility of
patronage dismissals of United States attorneys. The majority expressed no opinion as to
whether the deputy of a prosecutor could be dismissed on poitial grounds, but noted that
prosecutors hold broader public responsibilities than do assistant public defenders. Id. at
519 n. 13. The dissent argued that "it would be difficult to say, under the Court's standard,
that 'partisan' concerns properly are relevant to the performance of the duties of a United
States attorney." Id. at 524.
88. Id. at 513 n.7.
89. Upon entering an executive branch filled with members of the opposing Federalist
Party, Republican Thomas Jefferson noted the necessity of political discharges in creating
job vacancies. "Those by death are few; by resignation, none. Can any mode other than
that of removal be proposed?" See S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518 (1943).
More recently, Lyn Nofziger, a Reagan Administration assistant in charge of political appointments was quoted as stating: "We've got to clean out the Democrats and get our own
people taken care of." TIME, Mar. 16, 1981, at 32.
90. 445 U.S. at 517 n.12.

NOTE

19811

cans)."91
As a practical matter, Brand's impact on employment practices is limited at the federal level by the growth of the civil service in recent years.
Of 1.5 million federal jobs, only an estimated 3,000 are now filled with
patronage appointees. 92 Civil service employees have long been afforded
the protection from political discharge that Brand extends to their patronage employed counterparts. 93 Thus, Brand will affect dismissal practices in only a small percentage of federal government positions.
The greater potential significance of the Brand decision lies in the
Court's growing reluctance to permit political considerations in the distribution of government benefits. 94 In a footnote with wide-ranging implications, the Court states that "[g]overnment funds, which are collected from
taxpayers of all parties on a nonpolitical basis cannot be expended for the
benefit of one political party simply because that party has control of the
government. '95 Rather, the distribution of such benefits must be justified
by a governmental purpose. 96 Thus, Brand may endanger common patronage practices such as the distribution of government contracts and
services on a political basis.
III.

CONCLUSION

In Brand v. Finkel the Supreme Court held that government employees
may be dismissed for political reasons only when party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for effective job performance. The Court reaffirmed its plurality position in Elrod v. Burns that patronage dismissals
infringe first amendment freedoms of belief and association and, thus, are
justifiable only when vital state interests outweigh the resulting loss of first
amendment rights. It rejected, however, the principle in Elrod that the
determinative factor in such a consideration is whether an employee may
be characterized as confidential or policymaking. Rather, an employee
may be dismissed for political reasons only when party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for effective job performance. Moreover, although the Court limited its holding to patronage dismissals, it made clear
91. Id. at 520 n.14 (quoting Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 n.13 (S.D.N.Y.
1978)).
92. See NEWSWEEK, Apr. 14, 1980, at 30.

93. The civil service system was founded in an effort to eliminate corruption following
from the political use of patronage. See R. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW
§ 1.2 (1976). Accordingly, civil service laws specifically prohibit coercion of public employees to obtain political contributions or services. 18 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).

94. Among those benefits noted by the Court were the award of government contracts
on a political basis and the grant of improved government services to favored constituents.
445 U.S. at 513 n.7. The distribution of these and other government benefits for political
purposes has been extensive, as demonstrated by the Nixon Administration's "grantsmanship" program. Under this program, the Administration attempted to channel federal jobs,
contracts, grants, subsidies, bank deposits, social need programs, and public works projects
into target areas considered crucial to President Nixon's reelection. See R. VAUGHN, supra
note 93, § 1.4.
95. 445 U.S. at 517 n.12.
96. Id.
a
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that patronage hirings and the distribution of government benefits on a
political basis may now require justification by a governmental purpose.
Thus, Brani casts doubt on the continued permissibility of the 200-yearold patronage system as a whole.
Cindy Pladziewicz

